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Abstract
As it is well-known, the three main tools used by a decision maker in order to deal with disliked risks are saving, insurance and
prevention. In general, when an activity allows to reduce the expected cost of an agent’s loss we speak of prevention activity.
Focusing the attention on loss reduction and on loss prevention decisions, up to now most of the literature has concentrated on
static models in a single-period framework, or on special dynamic models with a two-period setting. In our paper we focus our
attention on the role played by time with the aim of characterizing the optimal prevention activities. In particular, our study is
devoted to the analysis of loss prevention actions, with different assumptions about the timing decisions.
c© 2013 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Emerging Markets Queries in Finance and
Business local organization
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1. Introduction
It is almost generally accepted in economic literature that when market insurance is not available, the behavior of a
Decision Maker DM facing the risk of a monetary loss is well-described by self-insurance and self-protection models.
More precisely, Ehrlich and Becker (1972) [5] referred to two different activities able to reduce the expected cost of
the DM’s loss: when the probability of being in the bad state is ﬁxed, they considered the reduction of the DM wealth
in order to diminish the size of the loss (self-insurance activity); when the loss extension is ﬁxed, they mentioned
the effort made by the DM at reducing the probability of loss (self-protection activity). Ehrlich and Becker proved
that contrary to intuition, prevention and insurance could be complements. Starting from their precursory work, some
Authors studied the role played by individual preferences in optimal prevention: among them, we mention Dionne and
Eeckhoudt (1985) [3], Briys and Schlesinger (1990) [1], Jullien et al. (1999) [8] focusing their study on risk aversion
and on optimal prevention, while Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2005) [6], Dionne and Li (2011) [4] analyzed the effect
of prudence on optimal prevention. Despite the ﬂourishing literature and the positive interest on this topics, some
results are still not well explained in the literature: for example, it is well-known that increased risk aversion does
not necessarily raise the optimal investment in prevention; moreover, if prudence plays a role in the determination
of thresholds for optimal prevention, the obtained results vary from DM to DM because of their utility-dependence.
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Furthermore, the issue of prevention in the presence of background risk just newly has been addressed (see Courbage
and Rey (2012) [2]); ﬁnally, the overall focus is essentially on static models, given that the inter-temporal nature of
prevention is just lately subject of analysis.
Differently to the common analysis of prevention in a static framework (i.e. a one-period framework in which the effort
in prevention and its effect on the probability are simultaneous), recently Menegatti (2009) [9] proposes a model in
which the decision to engage in prevention activity precedes its effect on the probability: his proposal clears the way
for simple conditions on individual preferences to consider the effect of a background risk on prevention; moreover, it
suggests the way forward to an explicit study of the role played by time in optimal prevention. Following Menegatti’s
proposal, Hofmann and Peter (2011) [7] studied optimal prevention decisions in a two-period expected utility model,
where anticipatory (today) prevention e1 and contemporaneous (tomorrow) prevention e2 are conducted. Note that
anticipatory prevention enables the DM to beneﬁt from a decrease in loss probability in the following period. They
assume, in other words, a unique prevention technology, i.e. a function p(e1,e2) that gives a measure of the loss
probability which is reduced by prevention e2 carried out in the same period of e2 and follows that of anticipatory
prevention e1. To the best of our knowledge, no work has so far addressed the issue of prevention in presence of
prevention efforts in the case of two different prevention technologies p and q: more precisely, if the decision to
engage in prevention activity precedes its effect on the probability, the DM can select at two subsequent time epochs
(say t0 and t1) a ﬁrst prevention activity e1 at t0 to reduce the probability of the potential loss in the following period,
and a second prevention activity e2 at t1 to reduce the probability of the potential loss in the same period. In our
proposal the two-period models (Menegatti (2009) [9], Hofmann and Peter (2011) [7]) are furthermore extended to
consider the case of a DM who knows that she will be confronted to risks in the future time epochs t1 and t2 but she
has the opportunity to undertake actions to modify the probabilities associated with the future risks.
The main difference between the approaches is the choice of two different prevention technologies and the timing
of the decision making processes. The importance of the distinction mainly relies on risky situations requiring self-
protection in the real world that are characterized by two periods of time between the moment the investment decision
is taken and the moment the random events realize. In such a way it seems unappropriate to use both a single setting
and a double setting with just one prevention technology, in order to model such a problem. In other words, in some
cases it is necessary to consider the deferred effect between prevention activities and risk exposures. Let us consider
for example the case of a car driver who wants to reduce the risk of crash: she can follow a speciﬁc driving course that
improves her public driving skills. In the same way she can choose some special primary (i.e. brake assist, traction
control systems and electronic stability control systems) and secondary (i.e. seat-belts, airbags, and more generally
the physical structure of the vehicle) safety technologies in order to prevent a crash (and to protect occupants during
a crash). The power of these different efforts as safety systems may change in time: in fact if the vehicle sensors help
the driver to decrease the probability of a loss L1 in the future epochs t1 and t2, the practice at t1 of speciﬁc driving
course inﬂuences the DM’s driving ability and reduces the probability of a (possibly different) loss L2 in the future
t2. The advantage of a multi-period viewpoint is that even both components of prevention can come into play, with
different effects on loss probabilities. The decision of a motor vehicle with advanced driver assistance systems can
be viewed as an investment in prevention today with the effect in all future epochs; the decision of a driving course
may reduce the loss probability in the next time epoch. Taking a multi-period viewpoint we can consider the case of
a DM attending a safety course at her workplace: this will have a positive effect on her health in all the future epochs.
If moreover a refresher course is proposed, there will be an adjoint contribute to her health in the future. This paper
tackles this kind of topics.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section (2) we ﬁrst set the basic deﬁnitions for describing the problem of a DM
facing the risks of a monetary loss in a multi-period framework, knowing that she will be confronted to risks in the
future time epochs and has the opportunity to undertake actions to modify the probabilities associated with the future
risks. Section (3) presents some numerical examples related to the proposed model. Finally Section (4) is devoted to
the problem of measuring how the candidate solutions change with reference to particular parameters, that is the time
interval lengths between prevention efforts and risks realizations. Section (5) ends the paper.
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2. The model
We consider three distinguished time epochs (named t0, t1 and t2) in which an agent can decide to take some
prevention actions (epochs t0 and t1) in order to lower the probability of losses in the future (epochs t1 and t2). More
precisely we assume that at time t0 the agent can decide to invest an amount e1 of her certain wealth w0 in prevention
activities. At time t1 the agent’s wealth w1 can be lowered by a loss L1 with a probability which is a function p(e1) of
the prevention activity e1. At time period t1 the agent can decide to undertake a new prevention activity, investing an
amount e2 of her deterministic wealth w1. In the last time period t2 the wealth w2 of the agent can be lowered by a loss
L2 with a probability q(e1,e2) which depends from both the two previous prevention activities. The Decision Maker
DM decides the amount to invest in prevention in order to maximize her total expected utility EU = EU(e1,e2). We
consider discounted future utilities with discount factors δ1, from time t0 to t1, and δ2, from time t1 to t2.
In this framework, given the agent’s utility function u, her expected utility can be written in a way that partially
recalls Hofmann and Peter [7], as
EU(e1,e2) = u(w0− e1)+ δ1 [p(e1)u(w1−L1− e2)+ (1− p(e1))u(w1− e2)]+ (1)
+ δ1δ2 [q(e1,e2)u(w2−L2)+ (1−q(e1,e2))u(w2)] .
The optimization problem faced by the agent coincides with the maximization of EU(e1,e2) with the following
constraints:
0 ≤ e1 ≤ w0 (2)
0 ≤ e2 ≤ w1−L1.
In this way we assume that prevention has only a delayed effect, which is rather different with respect to the
model presented in Hofmann and Peter where one prevention activity is considered as anticipatory and another one is
assumed to be contemporary, i.e. having an instantaneous effect on loss probability.
We suppose that prevention has a positive effect on future wealth, which is expressed assuming that probability p
is decreasing with respect to e1 and that q is decreasing with respect to both e1 and e2. We also assume that p and q
are convex functions, this way assuming a decreasing marginal effect of prevention on loss probabilities. The utility
function u is assumed to be increasing and concave, so that the agent can be either risk-neutral or risk-averse. In the
following we also assume that all the involved functions are twice continuously differentiable. Continuity assumption
on utility function U and non-empty compactness of feasible region ensure existence of optimal prevention policies
(e∗1,e
∗
2).
We explicitly consider the benchmark behavior of a risk neutral agent, with utility u(x) = ax+b where the marginal
utility a is strictly positive. The ﬁrst order necessary conditions characterizing any (interior) solution (e∗1,e
∗
2) are in
this case
−1− p1δ1L1− δ1δ2q1L2 = 0 (3)
−δ1− δ1δ2q2L2 = 0 (4)
where qi =
∂q
∂ei
, (i= 1,2) and p1 = p
′(e1).
From the ﬁrst order conditions we easily obtain the equivalent system of equations
q1 =
q2
δ1
−
L1
δ2L2
p1+ δ1q1 (5)
q2 =
−1
δ2L2
. (6)
Observe that, since p1 < 0, it turns out that q2 < δ1q1 while in the Hofmann and Peter model ([7]) model the
corresponding relation between marginal effects of prevention in the second time interval asserts that q2 is equal to
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δ1q1. Our different result means that the different time structure of prevention activity indicates that the marginal
effect of prevention in the second time period must be lower at optimal prevention efforts.
We can also observe that the expected utility function is concave with respect to the prevention efforts e1 and e2 in
the risk neutral case whenever the prevention technologies p(e1) and q(e1,e2) are convex with respect to each effort.
In fact EU can be rewritten as
EU(e1,e2) = [w0− e1+ δ1(w1− e2)+ δ1δ2w2]− δ1L1p(e1)− δ1δ2q(e1,e2)L2 (7)
where in square brackets we have a linear function of e1 and e2 while the last two terms are both concave with respect
to the same variables since we assume convex prevention technologies.
Imposing Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions on the optimization problem of maximization of (7) under the con-
straints (2), we easily obtain under which conditions the maximum belongs to the boundary. For example, a point
(w0,e
∗
2) corresponding to a maximum effort in prevention in the ﬁrst period, is optimal if and only if
−1− p1(w0)δ1L1− δ1δ2 q1(w0,e
∗
2)L2 ≥ 0 (8)
−δ1− δ1δ2 q2(w0,e
∗
2)L2 = 0. (9)
The latter conditions require in particular
q1(w0,e
∗
2) ≤
−1− p1(w0)δ1L1
δ1δ2L2
(10)
which, roughly speaking, means that the marginal effect of prevention e1 in the ﬁrst period on the probability q of
loss in the second time period must be remarkably high, i.e. little increases in prevention e1 signiﬁcantly decrease
probability of loss q. Very similar reasonings can be followed for other boundary solutions.
3. A numerical example
We consider now a numerical example in which we apply model (1) in the linear case. Following [7] we assume
the probability to incur in a loss at time t2 to be deﬁned as
q(e1,e2) = 0.3e
900
e1−100
−ln(2)+9
+0.3e
700
e2−100
−ln(2)+7
. (11)
This way when no prevention activity is undertaken (e1 = e2 = 0) the loss probability q reaches its maximum value,
assumed here to be 30%. For the probability to incur in a loss L1 at time t1 we consider a similar dependence on
the prevention activity setting e2 = 0, since till time t1 only one prevention activity can be undertaken. We consider
therefore
p(e1) = 0.3e
900
e1−100
−ln(2)+9
+0.3e
700
−100−ln(2)+7 . (12)
Setting w0=40, w1=100, w2=200, L1=50, L2=200 and d1=d2=0.98 the optimal choice of prevention activity can be
easily computed. The expected utility function for prevention activities e1 ∈ [0,40], e2 ∈ [0,50] is plotted in ﬁgure 1.
The maximumvalue of the expected utility function is EU(e∗1,e
∗
2) 277.5277, attained at e
∗
1  14.1682, e
∗
2  12.3363.
Setting w0=100, w1=200, w2=200, L1=100, d1=d2=0.98, we also explored how the optimal prevention activities
should vary as the loss amount L2 changes. In particular varying the second loss L2 between 0 (i.e. there is no loss) to
a maximum value of 200, we obtained the optimal preventions e∗1 and e
∗
2 depending on L2 as reported in ﬁgure (2). As
a remarkable fact we can observe that prevention e2 is not required for low values of loss L2, while the ﬁrst prevention
activity should always be undertaken. The effects of prevention e1, which affects both loss probabilities, are in fact
sufﬁcient to adequately (i.e. optimally) prevent both losses unless the second loss becomes rather high requiring a
prevention recall.
4. Comparative static results
From the system of equations (3) and (4), it is possible to study how an optimal prevention bundle (e∗1,e
∗
2) changes
with reference to the exogenous variables (δ1,δ2). In other words, the reduced form of the structural equation system
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Fig. 1. Expected utility function with e1 ∈ [0,40], e2 ∈ [0,50] (w0=40, w1=100,w2=200, L1=50, L2=200, d1=d2=0.98).
Fig. 2. Optimal prevention activities as a function of the second loss L2 (w0=100, w1=w2=200, L1=100, d1=d2=0.98).
(3),(4) allows the analysis of optimal preventions as functions of exogenous variables related to the time intervals
lengths.
More precisely, by the implicit function theorem we have that
(
e11 e12
e21 e22
)
=
(
δ1p11L1+ δ1δ2q11L2 δ1δ2q12L2
δ2q21L2 δ2q22L2
)−1 (
p1L1+ δ2q1L2 δ1q1L2
0 q2L2
)
(13)
where ei j denotes
∂ei
∂δ j
for i, j = 1,2 and p11 stands for p
′′(e1).
The determinant of the ﬁrst righthand side matrix A is
det(A) = δ1δ2L2 [p11q22L1+ δ2L2 det(Hq)] (14)
where det(Hq) denotes the determinant of the Hessian matrix (Hq) of the prevention technology q(e1,e2).
Nonnegativity of det(A) is ensured by convexity assumption on prevention technologies p(e1) and q(e1,e2); moreover,
if at least one prevention technology is strictly convex, matrix A admits inverse and
(
e11 e12
e21 e22
)
=
1
det(A)
(
−δ2L2q22(p1L1+ δ2L2q1) −δ1δ2L
2
2(q1q22−q2q12)
δ2L2q21(p1L1+ δ2L2q1) −δ1δ2L
2
2(q2q11−q1q21)− δ1L1L2p11q2
)
(15)
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Note that e11 is always strictly positive. This means that the ﬁrst optimal prevention effort e
∗
1 always increases
when the ﬁrst time interval decreases; that is, immediate future implies higher optimal prevention today: this conﬁrms
the intuition that every risk-neutral decision maker chooses a higher ﬁrst prevention e∗1 to maximize her expected
(time-separable) utility, when the ﬁrst potential loss L1 is approaching.
Moreover if in addition qi j < 0 for each i = j, necessarily we have that ei j > 0. Then not just the ﬁrst optimal
prevention e∗1 grows up when the second potential loss L2 is going closer but even the second optimal prevention e
∗
2 is
increasing, when L1 is drawing nearer.
In this way it is possible to characterize the dependence of each optimal prevention e∗i on δ j: for example
e12 > 0 ⇔ q1q22−q2q12 < 0 (16)
The monotonicity and convexity assumption on prevention technologies ensures that a sufﬁcient condition for strict
positivity of e12 (see (16)) is q12 < 0.
Moreover, it is possible write the sufﬁcient and necessary condition for strict increasing behavior of e∗1 when δ2
increases in the following equivalent way
e12 > 0 ⇔
∂ ln |q1|
∂e2
>
∂ ln |q2|
∂e2
. (17)
In the same way, it is possible to characterize the strictly increasing monotonicity of e∗2 as a function of δ2, that is
e22 > 0 ⇔ δ2L2(q2q11−q1q21)+L1p11q2 < 0. (18)
Also in this case we easily obtain that q2q11− q1q21 < 0 represents a sufﬁcient condition for strict positivity of e22
(see (18)).
Finally, note that
e22 > 0 ⇔ L1p1
∂ ln |p1|
∂e1
< δ2L2q1
∂ ln(|q2|/|q1|)
∂e1
. (19)
5. Concluding remarks
The economic literature on self-insurance and self-protection has generally proposed and studied models in which
efforts and realizations of uncertainty both take place at the same time epoch. This atemporal framework has been
recently extended in order to cover also cases in which the timing of the decision making process assumes a leading
role. We study the problem of a DM facing the risks of a monetary loss in a multi-period framework, knowing that
she will be confronted to risks in the future time epochs and has the opportunity to undertake actions to modify the
probabilities associated with the future risks: more precisely, we assume that prevention activities have only a delayed
effect. This approach seems to ﬁnd the main reason by real world where risky situations requiring self-protection are in
fact characterized by a signiﬁcant period of time between the moment the investment decision is taken and the moment
the risky event realizes. Setting our analysis in the context of expected utility maximization, we focus our attention on
a benchmark constrained optimization problem: that of a risk-neutral agent. Interior solutions, boundary solutions are
characterized and some static comparative results are proposed in order to conﬁrm the importance assumed by time
in self-protection modeling.
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